I. INTRODUCTION
In a common business arrangement, an American software company designs software in the United States, then sends the software code abroad where copies are mass-produced and distributed. Prior to the Federal Circuit's ruling in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the American company could have been found liable for patent infringement under Section 271(f) of the Patent Act if the software mass-produced abroad infringed a United States patent. Cardiac Pacemakers, however, leaves United States 1 patent owners defenseless when the allegedly infringed patent claims are method claims. The background of Cardiac Pacemakers, the Court's rationales, and the implications of the decision are the subject of this Note.
A. A Global Economy v. National Patent Systems
The goods and services of today's global economy often travel through several continents before reaching their final destination. Components of a 2 product may originate from all corners of the world; the product may be assembled in a different location; and the final product may be sold in yet another location only to be shipped anywhere in the world. Despite the increasingly global development of markets around the world, patent protection-the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, extraterritorial. Consequently, patent owners must operate within many different territorial patent systems to protect their inventions.
The territorial limit of a patent results in large expenses for patent owners who must "anticipate the varying levels of protection and attempt to maximize their opportunities on a country-by-country basis" by prosecuting patent applications in multiple patent systems and potentially litigating parallel patents in multiple jurisdictions. International agreements, such as the 5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter "TRIPS"), have begun to harmonize patent laws between member states by setting minimum levels of protection. Despite the harmonization 6 achieved by TRIPS, patent owners are still required to prosecute patent applications and to litigate patents in individual countries at high costs. A 7 leading patent scholar predicted over a decade ago that these "[t]wo developments-the increasing interdependence of the global economy and the growing concern over the cost of multinational intellectual property rights procurement and enforcement-will make territorialism an unacceptable obstacle to international trade." (1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2008) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2008).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). 12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2008) ("Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.").
B. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)'s Extraterritorial Reach
There are limited exceptions to the territorial limit of patent laws. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides that a patent may be infringed when a component or components of the patented invention are supplied from the United States and shipped abroad for assembly. The first subpart of Section 9 271(f) mirrors the inducing infringement provision of Section 271(b) requiring the supply of a substantial portion of components from the United States and the inducement of the combination of the components outside the United States into the patented invention. The second subpart of Section 271(f) 10 applies when a component especially made for the patented invention and not a staple article is supplied from the United States knowing and intending that the component will be combined outside the United States to form the patented invention. This subpart mirrors Section 271(c), the contributory 11 infringement provision.
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C. Confusion in the Courts: Varied Approaches to Applying 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)
The Supreme Court has followed a strict territorial rule and has not extended United States patent law extraterritorially without a clear signal from The varied approaches by the courts-either applying a strict territorial rule to limit the application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) or applying an effects-based test to expand the extraterritorial application of the statute-have confused the current state of the law. According to one scholar, "the current state of the law is unclear and lacks a firm theoretical foundation. The courts have failed to articulate a persuasive jurisprudence for assessing the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent rights." As a result of the confusion, patent owners are less able confronted with or asserting infringement allegations. In the midst of this problematic confusion, Cardiac Pacemakers arrived in the Federal Circuit.
D. The Cardiac Pacemakers Decision
The 
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Territoriality is "[t]he principle that a nation has the right of sovereignty within its borders." According to Professor Goldstein, three maxims are 24 incorporated into the principle of territoriality: (1) a state's laws should only have force within that state's borders, (2) anyone within the state's boundaries is subject to the laws of that state, and (3) comity should "discipline sovereign exercises of authority so that the territorial effect of each state's laws is respected." As stated by the United States Supreme Court, the "legislation Explicit articulation of such principles will not merely facilitate the evolution of international intellectual property law, nor simply satisfy the Supreme Court's admonition . . . to address such matters in statutory construction analyses when potential issues of extraterritoriality are implicated, but also avoid what otherwise could appear to some as a unilateral assertion of patent infringement jurisdiction, justified solely in terms of national law, over the technology of a trans-national system."). 31. For example, the United States patent system includes "higher-order living animals, computer software, and business methods" as patentable subject matter, though many other countries do not protect this subject matter. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2164.
32. Scholars have proposed alternative solutions to protecting the United States patent owner without extraterritorially extending United States law. For example, Timothy Holbrook suggests that courts should "explicitly consider foreign law in assessing whether to enforce a patent extraterritorially" so that an alleged infringer would not be held liable under United States patent law unless he "would also infringe under the laws of the foreign country." Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2120. Kendra Robins suggests that "U.S. courts should look to the adjudication of parallel foreign patents in addition to the U.S. patent in suit." Robins argues that "[i]n many situations, the adjudication of foreign patents serves as a practical alternative that can alleviate some of the policy concerns arising from the courts' recent constructions of Section 271(f) and (g industry and United States method patent owners. The Federal Circuit's decision to limit application of Section 271(f) to non-method patents should invite Congress to reconsider these countervailing concerns for method patents. Upon reconsideration, it should be apparent that a legislative amendment to Section 271 is necessary which clearly rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality and extends United States patent law for method patents under a provision similar to Section 271(f). Without such an amendment, method patents will remain devalued and, consequently, there will be little incentive for inventors to obtain them.
B. Brown v. Duchesne: An Early Statement on the Territoriality of United States Patent Law
Under the territoriality principle, the patent laws of the United States are presumed only to apply within the boundaries of the United States. This has 34 long been a foundational principle of United States patent law. Brown v.
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Duchesne is the first reported case commenting on the territoriality of United States patent laws. In Brown v. Duchesne, the Supreme Court failed to find 36 patent infringement although a French schooner with an allegedly patent infringing sail was docked in a Boston harbor under the "temporary presence doctrine." The Court continued in dicta with the often-cited statement on the 37 territoriality of United States patent laws:
[T]hese acts of Congress [the Patent Statutes] do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and as the patentee's right of property and exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which the law itself is confined. And the use of it outside of the jurisdiction of the United States is not an infringement of his rights, and he has no claim to any compensation for the profit or advantage the party may derive from it.
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In other words, the principle of territoriality restricts the United States from imposing United States patent laws outside the jurisdiction of the United States. The components were shipped in three separate boxes and could be assembled into the patented machine in less than an hour. Because the patented product In Enpat, the district court determined that Microsoft's foreign sales of its Microsoft Project and Microsoft Team Manager products did not infringe a patented method for a project manager system. Id. at 539. In reaching this conclusion, the district court examined the legislative history of the statute finding an "exclusive focus on the sale of components patented in the United States for combination into a finished product, apparatus, or invention abroad;" thus, the court held that § 271(f) did not apply to method patents.
Id.
The following year, the District Court of Delaware reached the opposite conclusion in W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., an infringement case involving a patented chemical composition. 60 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Del. 1999). Though the opinion did not explicitly address application of Section 271(f) to method patents, the court adopted a broad interpretation of "component" in applying the statute to chemical compositions noting that "[n]owhere in the statute or its legislative history is there a limitation to components of machines and other structure combinations." Id. at 321.
Over ten years after the Court's invitation to Congress to resolve the Deepsouth loophole, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) was enacted, which legislatively overruled the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Deepsouth. Court concluded by affirming the presumption against extraterritoriality: "United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world" and this presumption "applies with particular force in patent law." 75 
III. THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS DECISION
A. The Background of the Cardiac Pacemakers Decision
In Cardiac Pacemakers, the challenged claim was directed to a method of treating abnormal heart rhythms by determining the heart condition, selecting cardioversion as the appropriate therapy, and executing a cardioverting shock with an implantable cardiovascular defibrillator (ICD). 76 Cardiac Pacemaker alleged that a competitor produced ICDs in the United States that were capable of performing the patented method and exported these ICDs abroad. Cardiac Pacemaker argued that the ICDs were 77 components of the patented method claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and, thus, that the exportation of these "components" violated Section 271(f).
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Cardiac Pacemakers followed a circuitous route to the Federal Circuit's en banc opinion. Upon reaching the en banc Federal Circuit, the court 79 Additionally, she acknowledges the potentially unfair effect of the statute on United States businesses, but still asserts that the en banc majority "overreacted as well as overreached" in limiting application of the statute to nonmethod patents.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CARDIAC PACEMAKERS
The implications of the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Cardiac Pacemakers relate to various dimensions of the patent system including the international patent community, United States businesses, and owners of United States method patents. Upon review of the costs and benefits of the decision, it is recommended that Congress amend Section 271 of the Patent Act to protect United States method patent owners under a provision similar to Section 271(f).
A. Costs and Benefits of the Holding on Various Dimensions of the Patent System
Impact on International Extraterritoriality Concerns
Prior to the Cardiac Pacemakers decision, United States courts had increasingly broadened the application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), thus increasing international extraterritoriality concerns. Though Section 271(f) still remains intact for non-method patents after Cardiac Pacemakers, the creation of a loophole for method patents reduces the scope of the statute. Consequently, the international patent community's extraterritoriality concerns are reduced.
Arguably, however, Section 271(f) may not even invoke strong concerns related to extraterritoriality. Judge Newman's dissent in Cardiac Pacemakers argued that Section 271(f) does not violate any of Professor Goldstein's principles of territoriality. Arguably, infringement under Section 271(f) 124 does not result from any acts abroad. Rather, infringement requires "some domestic act as a hook to reach foreign-based economic activity that harms a patent owner's interest in deriving full economic advantage from the U.S. Corp., the Federal Circuit held that Section 271(f) does not require evidence of actual assembly abroad. Rather, the critical elements to find infringement 126 liability under Section 271(f) are the supply of components from the United States with intent to combine the components into the patented invention. These elements relate to conduct and culpability within the United States. Therefore, while Cardiac Pacemakers reduces extraterritoriality concerns related to Section 271(f), the legitimacy of these concerns is unclear.
Impact on United States Businesses
Additionally, the Cardiac Pacemakers decision has important implications for United States businesses. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) arguably undermines the capacity of U.S. companies to compete in the U.S. market for the patented invention against other companies located abroad. Specifically, 127 a United States company that ships components of a patented invention abroad for final assembly may be found liable for infringement under Section 271(f). Comparatively, a foreign company or an American company with facilities abroad that manufactures the same components for assembly into the patented invention cannot be found liable under Section 271(f). Therefore, American companies are discouraged from producing goods and services in the United States. Innovators may move Research and Development facilities and manufacturing facilities overseas in order to avoid increased liability for infringement. The movement of additional American companies' facilities 128 overseas could hurt the United States economy and reduce the availability of jobs for Americans. Arguably, the exclusion of method patents from the scope of Section 271(f) counterbalances the movement of United States facilities overseas because domestic companies will not be subject to infringement liability when exporting the components that are used to practice a patented method.
Impact on United States Patent Owners
The recent Cardiac Pacemakers decision appears to benefit United States businesses by limiting infringement liability. However, limiting application 129. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("A statutory interpretation that results in all process inventions being seriously devalued, is not free of the charge of 'absurd result.'"). of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to non-method patents will simultaneously hurt United States method patent owners. The newly created loophole allows for easy circumvention of liability for method patent infringement, which will often leave method patent owners without a remedy. Companies like St. Jude Medical can now avoid infringement liability simply by exporting parts used to practice a patented method. Consequently, the value of method claims is reduced. It is likely that patent prosecutors will cease drafting devalued 129 method claims when an alternative apparatus claim protects the invention and remains enforceable under Section 271(f).
Interestingly, there is a large overlap between those who appear to benefit-largely the United States industries who have decreased infringement liability when manufacturing components used to practice a patented method-and those who will be hurt-United States companies who own valuable method patents-by the Cardiac Pacemakers decision. Robust intellectual property rights are characteristic of the United States patent system. Rigorous enforcement of such rights in the United States is generally supported by business that own United States method patents, which they want to protect. Though conceivably many United States businesses may face increased infringement liability post-Cardiac Pacemakers, many United States businesses will also be unable to enforce their method patents in the United States and will be left without a remedy as in Cardiac Pacemakers.
B. Likelihood and Necessity of a Legislative Amendment
After the Federal Circuit's Cardiac Pacemakers decision, the American software company that designs software in the United States and then sends the software code abroad for the mass production of copies, is only liable for infringement of the United States patent if the patent claimed an apparatus, such as a computer, that used the software. A United States patent claiming the software as a method would not be infringed under Section 271(f). This convoluted result dramatically hurts United States method patent owners.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Deepsouth, Congress stepped forward with a legislative amendment to close the Deepsouth loophole. Perhaps the Cardiac Pacemakers decision indicates that another legislative amendment is necessary. Several factors currently affecting the application of Section 271(f) were unforeseen at the time the provision was enacted. For example, "changes in technology and increases in the crossborder movement of goods" affect the rights of United States patent owners. Arguably, these changes "teed this issue up for judicial and legislative reform." 130 A complete repeal of Section 271(f) was proposed in the 2006 Patent Reform Act. However, the proposal was withdrawn because AT&T II was 131 pending for decision before the Supreme Court and it was considered more appropriate to leave the statute intact so that the judicial branch could properly interpret the statute and resolve the issue. It was suggested, "with its 132 decision in Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court resolved the principle concern over section 271(f) and eliminated the need for legislative reform." 133 However, Cardiac Pacemakers indicates that the Supreme Court did not resolve all the issues related to Section 271(f). While it is likely that Cardiac Pacemakers resolved the ambiguities of Section 271(f), the resolution leaves United States method patent owners in a defenseless position that necessitates further action by Congress.
Congress should close the method patent loophole created by Cardiac Pacemakers by adding another infringement provision to Section 271. For example, an infringement provision could create liability when United States manufacturers export tangible components used in the practice of a patented method knowing and intending the patented method to be practiced abroad. Ultimately, Congress must weigh the economic and extraterritorial concerns of an additional infringement provision applicable to method patents with the breadth of rights necessary for method patent owners.
In consideration of extraterritoriality concerns, Congress should enact a statute where liability is contingent on conduct and culpability within the United States. When liability stems from acts entirely within the United States, concerns related to extraterritoriality are not very relevant. The court should also consider the economic concerns related to United States businesses and method patent owners. Arguably, some United States businesses may be hurt by the increased infringement liability under the . But see Gruebel, supra note 28, at 526-27 ("Section 271(f), however, fails to provide . . . positive incentives, and in actuality only serves to stifle U.S. technological innovation for three reasons. First, 271(f) provides no meaningful prospect of protection against competition, or even 'the right to exploit [an] invention' in a foreign market. . . . Second, where the sale of an invention in a foreign market is material to the decision to commercialize the invention, 271(f) provides only negative incentives, effectively stifling technological growth and innovation. . . . Third, the recent and dramatic change in the interpretation of the scope and function of 271(f) by the Federal Circuit in AT&T, Eolas, and Union Carbide has introduced varying degrees of uncertainty into the high technology economic market, which is anathema to the entire patent regime.").
proposed amendment. However, many businesses will also benefit from the strengthened enforcement mechanisms for their method patents.
Congress may also consider whether the increased value in method patents under the proposed amendment is necessary in view of the purposes of the patent system. The patent right-the right to a limited monopoly over the invention-is intended to provide an economic incentive for innovators. The economic rationale for patent monopolies or "exclusive right balance the need to incentivize innovators by protecting method patents with the countervailing extraterritoriality concerns of the international community and infringement liability concerns of United States businesses. Upon thoughtful balancing of these concerns, it is recommended that Congress close the loophole created by Cardiac Pacemakers by enacting legislation that protects United States method patent owners from the newly created Cardiac Pacemakers loophole.
